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ABSTRACT 
 
The hallmark of the Singapore state-led, market-driven interventions, and their efficacy, have 
often been a matter of academic contention. This paper, as part of our series on this topic, 
revisits Singapore‟s state-enterprise strategy in the context of the city-state‟s determined 
efforts at internationalization through a series of state-engineered projects, orchestrated to 
encapsulate economic space for Singapore-based firms to expand into the region and beyond. 
This internationalization stratagem remains controversial; premised, as they are, on the 
exportability of Singapore‟s state credibility, systemic and operational efficiencies as well as 
technological competencies of Singaporean companies, government-linked or otherwise, to 
locations where these attributes are less distinct. To shed some light on this controversy, and 
to add an „Arabian allure‟ to our ongoing research, we present evidence from the gambits of 
Singapore companies into the GCC countries. Our results show that the strategic advantage 
created in the Singapore-styled mega-projects remains uncertain; that the performance of 
Singapore companies is stable, if unspectacular. At the same time, however, additional 
complications relating to individual socio-political environments continue to plague these 
mega-projects, even as they adapt to impending challenges in a changing environment. 
 
Key Words: Internationalization, Singapore Companies, GCC Countries   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From a history of post-colonial uncertainty to that of a premier location for multinational 
enterprise, Singapore‟s development strategies of state-led, market-driven interventions have 
been a matter of academic interest (Rodan, 1989; Huff, 1995). The Singapore government‟s 
corruption-free administration throughout the years, coupled with infrastructural efficiency 
and the overall integrity of its legal and financial systems, have played a central role in 
attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the city-state‟s economic development. The 
constraints of a city-state, however, rendered it an imperative for Singapore‟s economic 
planners to re-examine and re-engineer the city-state's investment horizons. The Singapore 
Economic Development Board (SEDB) positioned the city-state‟s internationalization 
strategy in a policy paper, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 
1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference and the 1993 Regionalization Forum added new 
dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB 1990, 1993), while the Singapore Ministry of 
Finance‟s 1993 Report and the policy documents, Singapore Unlimited and Regionalization 
2000, encapsulated the stratagem for Singapore‟s participation in the dynamic growth of 
regional economies like Indonesia, Vietnam and China (SEDB, 1995a, 1995b). Various 
scholarly works have taken these discussions forward (Okposin, 1999; Yeoh, et al, 2006; 
How & Yeoh, 2007). 
 
The Singapore government‟s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of 
familiar and friendly Singapore-havens (via industrial parks in neighboring countries) and the 
restructuring of tax policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993).  The state also embarked 
on fostering trusted regional networks identical to those within its domestic market, whereby 
interlocking interests and a perceived commonality of values were to crystallize a system of 
cooperative competition. Implicit in this stratagem was the government‟s intent to draw on its 
state enterprise network or, in local parlance, Singapore Inc., and extend this network to 
facilitate business ventures in the region. This strategy to remain economically competitive in 
the global economy has been characterized by the building of platforms for national growth 
through the management of strategic alliances and „collaborations‟ with private or semi-
private enterprises on national economic projects. Theoretically, the „vested interests‟ within 
the interlinked collaborative system were to serve to expedite processes, garner exclusive 
incentives, and negate inept bureaucracy; like parts in an intricate and complex machine 
(Yeoh et al, 2004).   
 
This strategy itself is a synergy of state intervention policies. Political leaders, in the initial 
phase, negotiate the projects‟ institutional framework that typically involves the garnering of 
special investment conditions in the host locations. They also secure endorsements from host-
country governments to provide political patronage and protection to the projects, which are 
critical for attracting potential investors. Following which, government-led consortia, 
typically comprising of Singapore government agencies and government-linked companies 
(GLCs), take on the role of primary investors in the Singapore-styled developments; justified 
by the perceived reluctance of firms in the private-sector to take on investments of such 
gargantuan scale, and given the considerable time lag before any realization of investment 
would materialize. Moreover, the high risks involved in venturing into a relatively 
undeveloped and unfamiliar locale renders such projects inherently unattractive to private 
enterprises, due to the uncertain political climate and investors‟ interests. The Singapore 
government takes on the role of a `business architect‟ and `knowledge arbitrageur‟, identifies 
business opportunities, and brings together the private sector and commercial segments of the 
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public sector in Singapore, as well as foreign companies with specific competencies, to 
undertake these large-scale investment projects. The presence of government agencies and 
government-linked companies adds weight to this internationalization stratagem.  
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Dunning‟s (1988, 2001) eclectic paradigm proffers an analytical framework in which to 
examine the patterns and extent of activities of firms engaged in value-added activities 
beyond their national boundaries. It seeks to explain the ability and willingness of firms to 
serve markets by delving into the reasons behind their choice of exploiting this advantage 
through foreign production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource 
flows. The eclectic paradigm postulates that foreign investment will only occur if it is 
advantageous combine spatially transferable intermediate products in the home country, with 
at least some immobile factor endowments or other intermediate products in another country 
(Dunning, 1988, 2000). Specifically, the configuration of ownership-specific advantages (O), 
location-specific advantages (L) and internalization-incentive advantages (I) – the three types 
of advantages into which Dunning classifies the reasons for the behavior of firms – 
determines international production and it‟s nature. 
 
The framework goes on to assert that the importance of each advantage of the OLI 
triumvirate, and the relationships between them, varies across firms, industries and countries, 
and are context-specific; based on factors, including the firm‟s country of origin, and the 
country it seeks to invest in. What is common, however, is the appropriation of the O-
advantages through the exploitation of firm-specific resources, and the simultaneous 
procurement of I-advantages through the diminution of transaction costs. Subsequent 
iterations drew attention to L(ocation)-advantages (Dunning, 1998; Jovanovic, 2003), and 
agglomeration benefits of knowledge spillovers (Krugman, 1991), transactional benefits of 
spatial proximity (Porter, 1998) and. immobile clusters of complementary value-added 
activities (Markusen, 1996). As well, as firm‟s core competencies become increasingly 
knowledge-intensive, the location in which firms locate their production, organization and 
use of assets emerges as a critical competitive advantage (Dunning, 2000a). MNEs continue 
to seek locations (economic and institutional facilities) that are best utilizing their core 
competencies.  
 
More recent literature has given centre stage to the role of governments in advancing the 
competitiveness of a country (or region within a country), as created assets supersede natural 
factor endowments as a key determinant of location.. Dunning (1997b) and Stopford (1999) 
also argue that governments need to ensure that the availability, quality and cost effectiveness 
of general purpose inputs have to match up to the standards of their global competitors, as 
well as to create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos.  This is to facilitate a 
continuous upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, 
rather than impede micro-regional clusters development and upgrading (Porter, 2000). 
 
Singapore‟s gambits in the GCC countries represent collaborative efforts by the Singapore 
and respective host governments to create location-bound advantages within more uncertain 
environments, through a propitious combination of cost-effective factors of production, 
efficient infrastructure and management expertise, i.e. supplementing natural location-
specific advantages with engineered ones crafted to complement the economic diversification 
efforts in the host locations. The strong presence of Singapore‟s GLCs amongst the 
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internationalizing firms, and the plethora of incentives made available to Singapore firms 
venturing into the GCC, maintain the relevance of discussion of political nuances, inter alia, 
Dunning‟s alliance capitalism.   
 
In the following section, we briefly outline the circumstances under which many Singapore 
companies covered entered into the Middle East, specifically Bahrain and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), and the various situational factors deriving therefrom. Thereafter, we 
present case studies of Singapore companies, government-linked or not, that have ventured 
into these two regions, discuss the various issues and challenges faced by these companies, 
and finally conclude with our preliminary conclusions on the state of Singapore 
internationalization into the GCC region.  
 
SINGAPORE’S GAMBITS IN  
BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
 
There is a strong demand for Singaporean presence in Middle Eastern developments, and 
Singapore‟s service offerings have a strong positioning. The Singapore brand is highly 
regarded, seen as a standard of quality in Arab business and government circles. They are 
keen to learn from Singapore‟s track record in city-scale infrastructure implementation. With 
most Middle East economies dominated by government spending, especially through state-
backed government-linked companies (GLCs), it is easy for Singapore to fully capitalise on 
the city-state‟s positive reputation. This is further aided by the “looking east” strategy 
adopted by GCC countries, post-911. 
 
Singapore companies entered the 1
st
 phase of the Middle East boom with architects, 
developers and master planners having successfully marketed the Singapore brand and 
excellence in the region (International Enterprise Singapore, 2007/2008). Broadly classified, 
Singapore companies that have made the internationalizing journey to the GCC countries fall 
into several classifications, with Singapore GLCs leading the way into this relatively new 
frontier of investment and internationalization, but with non-GLCs following close behind, 
relying for the most part on their own business acumen and strategies, but taking advantage of 
support from both Singapore governmental entities, such as International Enterprise Singapore, 
and business groups, such as the Singapore Business Federation (SBF), which have also taken a 
keen interest in the internationalization efforts.  It goes without saying, however, that the 
methods, motives, and machinations of these two support groups are markedly different; and 
similarly, it need not be said that both the occurrence of unfortunate events in recent years and 
the lessons learnt over time have necessitated a shift in some priorities in both support groups. 
 
As previously stated, there exists a clear distinction between Singapore entrants into the Middle 
East, which comprise GLCs on one side of the divide, with policy-based goals jostling for 
space with corporate ones, and their non-GLC counterparts with less lofty and more practical 
aspirations on the other. Furthermore, while the majority of GLCs such as CapitaLand, Changi 
Airports International, Jurong International, Keppel Corporation, SembCorp Industries and 
Surbana International are involved in property and/or infrastructure development, with the 
attendant issues of scale, non-GLCs expanding in the region can be further categorized into 
those also involved in consultancy services like DP Architects, RSP Architects and Design 
Studio; in lifestyle and entertainment services like Cathay (cineplexes); in food and beverage 
operations like BreadTalk, Fish and Co, IndoChine, Pastamania and Corona; in retail-franchise 
arrangements such as Charles & Keith, Osim, PrettyFit and Royal Sporting House; and in the 
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next phase, from healthcare services such as Raffles Medical Group and Parkway Healthcare 
(Sources: IE Singapore (Beyond Singapore), special issues on Middle East; The Business 
Times, various issues, 2006-2010; The Straits Times, various issues, 2006-2010; corporate 
websites).  
 
Our case studies, drawn from the real estate and hospitality sectors, have been selected to 
reflect both dichotomies. Companies A and B are Singapore government-linked companies. 
 
Company A: Property Development (Commercial & Residential) 
 
Among the largest and oldest players in Singapore‟s property and development industry 
through the dual advantages of government links, massive capital reserves and a proven 
international track record, Company A finds itself in much the opposite position in the 
Middle East; a rather late entrant which, by a measure of scale, finds itself a half-magnitude 
or so below some of the major players in the region. Some measure of prescience, perhaps, 
was shown in the company placing its 2005 entries in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, which both 
have the same deep pockets but lack the degree of overcrowding seen at the time in Dubai, 
and which are, apparently, not yet „mature markets‟, at least in the property and development 
industry. Certainly, the springboard potential of these two locations were a factor as well – 
Bahrain for its financial hub status across the entire region, and a test-bed for the Saudi 
market, and Abu Dhabi as the second most convenient location to infiltrate the UAE market. 
The trigger for entry in both cases, however, appears to have been the same – an invitation by 
local firms to enter into a partnership for particular projects. No such convenient invitation 
from Dubai appears to have materialized for Company A as yet – nor does one look likely to 
be forthcoming, especially under current conditions. 
 
Similarly, the local partners in both Bahrain and Abu Dhabi play the role of liaison and 
buffer, having brought Company A into their respective markets and shielding it from socio-
political forces. For the ostensible sake of coordinating efforts with said local partners, 
Company A, which technically has four arms to its property and development business, has 
chosen in both cases to bring only its real estate expertise to the table, unwilling, it seems, to 
extend its product line to corporate offices (this being partially a function of the nature of the 
developments it is involved in), nor finding it necessary to provide financial services when 
such a deep and ready pool of capital already lies in the region. Also, the projects it is 
undertaking in both cities are iconic and immense, of which the company is responsible for 
the construction of a good percentage thereof; in other words, projects which can make or 
break the company‟s foray into the region. Company A seems prepared to tackle the sheer 
scale of these projects, and not just because of a greater wealth of experience with large-scale 
projects, but it also has fewer reservations with making a significant capital commitment to 
its operations in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi; its Bahrain operations are funded by a shariah-
compliant fund, with capital of over US$350 million, invested expressly for this venture, 
whereas interviews reveal a far greater willingness than most to glut staff counts when 
necessary. This staff complement, however, is still strongly Singaporean-dominated, owing to 
the company‟s GLC status; and while these regional offices enjoy a far greater degree of 
autonomy, the representatives of these offices reveal a worrying amount of competitive focus 
on competitors in the home region (i.e. from around Singapore) rather than on major 
international players in the same market, many of whom (as previously noted) already 
saturate Dubai, extend feelers into Abu Dhabi, and are far from being unknown in Bahrain. 
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Perhaps the company believes it has time to establish a brand name and solid market presence 
before it has to truly deal with such competitors in its markets of choice. 
 
A further issue, in fact, lies in the nature of aforementioned „brand name‟, where much of the 
goodwill accrued by the said brand is predicated upon the conjunction of the various parts of 
its operations, including all four arms of its property and development business – which have 
not all been implanted into its Middle East operations. This will be somewhat hard to 
achieve, when one is not the majority owner of the said properties, and will have local 
politics and tribal allegiances to consider, as is the situation Company A will find itself in 
Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. Dispute, in fact, has previously already arisen pertaining to the 
management of the project – conflict triggered, perhaps, by recent global recession, but one 
with its roots in the very foundation of the project, and the approach undertaken by Company 
A. Strategy, in this case, may very well have spawned a disconnect with competency; and 
given the scale and iconic status of Company A‟s initial foray into these two territories, any 
form of failure may well prove fatal to the company‟s further development in the region. 
 
Company B: Property Development (Industrial) 
 
Company B is another Singapore government-linked company extending its operations into 
the Middle East. Company B focuses on industrial development projects, rather than 
hospitality, retail or lifestyle developments; also, while initially purely a consultancy firm, the 
company has recently expanded into the actual planning of industrial townships, and is 
currently engaged in an iconic industrial development in Abu Dhabi. It has also since 
established offices in other emirates in the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Company B is, in fact, a relatively recent entity, having been incorporated in 2001, but being 
a GLC, inherited much of its staff, contacts, contracts, and operational procedures from its 
parent agencies and companies. Its current contract in Abu Dhabi, indeed, appears to have 
been one of these inherited contracts; its parent bodies having initially been invited to review 
the abovementioned development before its incorporation. As such, the company shares 
many of the aspects of the GLCs of its type, including the mechanism by which it entered the 
Middle East – through invitation – and the issues which it has encountered thus far, 
including, at the current time, the presence of many internationally renowned players in the 
property development sector having arrived and established themselves beforehand. The 
company has, however, developed a positive reputation for itself in the years since its 
conception, partially owing to the large degree of autonomy granted to its regional offices, 
resulting in a greater capacity for adaptation to local socio-political forces, and eliminating 
the time delay that a greater reliance on the home office in Singapore would spawn. And, 
indeed, the company appears to have been rather more proactive in its internationalization 
approach than most; while, like many other GLCs, its chosen mode of entry is through joint 
ventures and partnerships with politically powerful partner firms (often local GLCs 
themselves), Company B appears to have been the inviter as often as it has been, so to speak, 
the invitee. This is, we feel, a positive contributor towards the company's nascent but growing 
reputation in the Middle East, and appears to have been a key factor in their relatively rapid 
expansion across the region. Another contributing factor, perhaps, is the company's stated 
focus on teamwork and integrity; a focus that not only echoes Singapore's purported selling 
points, but resounds with their highly social and trust-oriented Arabic partners. 
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Yet these same 'selling points' contain an issue endemic to most GLCs expanding into the 
region; the expectation, from both local partners as well as the home office, of the company 
exporting Singapore's qualities of efficiency and reliability. From the home office, this 
translates into pressure on the company to achieve goals not immediate to the success of their 
projects, or indeed to their operations in general; from local partners, this creates the 
perennial risk of the occurrence of an expectation gap resulting from the impact of socio-
political factors. Thus far, however, such disconnect in goals and communication does not 
seem imminent; perhaps, indeed, precisely because of the company's relatively recent 
„conception‟. Company B, in fact, appears to be one of the more positive role models among 
Singapore‟s GLCs in the Middle East thus far; a testament, perhaps, to a more decentralized 
approach to Singapore internationalization, and one with less political baggage. 
 
Company C: Property Development (Consultancy & Design) 
 
Company C is one of Singapore‟s premier architectural design and consultancy firms, and has 
international offices in much of Southeast Asia and in major development spots such as 
China and India. Given this fact, it was rather unsurprising that Company C would seek to 
expand into the Middle East – specifically Dubai – in an attempt to profit from the property 
boom. In de facto partnership with a major property developer, thanks to personal 
connections, Company C made its entry into the emirate in 2003; among the first of its 
Singapore peers to do so, but very much a late mover among internationally acclaimed firms 
with operations in the design and construction industry. Taking this, as well as other factors 
mentioned later, into account, it is quite probable that Company C owes its strategic position 
in Dubai largely to its relationship with the emirate‟s largest property conglomerate.  
 
With a major local partner as a buffer for socio-political and economic forces even before 
actual entry into Dubai, Company C had a rather more sheltered experience than most, and 
has continued to capitalize on the local partners to deal with the local context, by adopting the 
strategy of hiring local consultants to handle procedures unfamiliar to the highly Singaporean 
management of Company C, among other sub-contracts. Part of this is intelligent practicality, 
but just as much of it is necessity, stemming largely from two reasons. The first of these 
reasons is Company C‟s management system, where decision-making authority is heavily 
concentrated in the company‟s Singapore office, a global strategy which ostensibly allows for 
greater potential economies of scale. Staff from the main office, together with funds and 
limited authority of agency, is dispersed to local offices to help „customize products‟ to the 
specific needs of the client. In practice, however, despite the smoother processes engendered 
by the close incorporation of the local office into Company C‟s corporate structure, factors 
both physical and mental often create unnecessary delays and place strains on the company‟s 
operations. A five hour time zone difference between Dubai and Singapore, and the odd and 
rather fluid schedules of some Emirati clients - unavoidably create periods of time where 
responsiveness and decision-making is not at its peak. As well, the necessity to communicate 
with the home office on major decisions creates significant opportunities for 
miscommunication and wrong-footing, a problem only exacerbated by disconnects between 
the home office and local conditions that is symptomatic of similar organizational systems. 
The presence of local consultants, and of their local partners, has been invaluable thus far in 
avoiding any significant slip-ups of this nature; it remains to be seen whether these will be 
enough in the future. 
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Dubai does not do half-measures, and its full measures are decidedly larger than those of 
most other countries, including those of pretty much everywhere. The sheer difference in 
scale goes beyond „daunting‟ and creeps into „unfathomable‟ – and indeed, with abundant 
local help or not, it is to Company C‟s credit that they encountered few major issues with the 
iconic project they were involved with. It remains a mystery, though, that Company C‟s 
office in Dubai remains relatively small, with a staff count of only some 80 members; given 
the manpower requirements that even an average one of Dubai‟s large-scale developments 
requires, this trim and cost-saving staff count does not really seem to be doing Company C 
any favors. And, such cost-reducing measures do indeed seem to be on the collective mind of 
the company; interviews indicate an incremental approach to staff increases and the transfer 
of master planning processes and products, for the lower commitment level and lighter sunk 
investment required. That such endemically Singaporean thought processes continue to rule 
the company‟s strategy at, perhaps, the expense of more practical business concerns should, it 
is felt, be a matter of concern for Company C. Some competencies do not transfer well, if at 
all. That said, such an approach meant that Company C suffered relatively less than many of 
its peers during the Dubai debt crisis, and from following regional instabilities; how much of 
this is owed to foresight, and how much to habit, though, is unclear. 
 
Company D: Property Development & Management (Resorts & Spas) 
 
Company D is in the business of constructing, managing, and operating site-intensive spas, 
hotels, and specialty resorts. Company D is a long-time entrant in the Middle East, having 
made its presence felt for nearly a decade; as such, it has made little to no use of (Singapore) 
government incentives and support schemes, having been established long before the island-
state‟s attention turned fully to the region. In more recent years, however, Company D has 
taken its expansion in the region to aggressive levels, concurrent with its entrance into the 
UAE, an unprecedented pace of expansion appearing to be fed by the equally unrepressed (at 
the time) mushrooming of the region itself, most notably, in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. 
Understandably, then, there were few worries about sustainability in the short-term, 
especially given the large amounts of capital their Arab partners were willing to sink into 
developments of this nature; the real issue would have been of long-term sustainability, and 
inextricably tied to the question of the long-term sustainability of the rate of growth of 
Bahrain and the UAE themselves. It goes without saying, unfortunately, that said long-term 
sustainability has since been found somewhat lacking. 
 
Originally, the company seemed poised to take advantage of the Middle East boom, with 
seeming imperviousness to many endemic issues that plagued other corporate entrants. 
Company D‟s operations were built to capitalize on the natural landscapes of the Middle 
Eastern environment, and were largely constructed with architecture in the Middle Eastern 
style, on much the same basis. Despite this, however, management of these spas and resorts 
was still very much Asian in concept and flavor, a purportedly „signature exotic and reclusive 
character‟ with excellent and unobtrusive service, in other words, much the same as its 
developments in other countries. In this case, it appeared that the very nature of Company 
D‟s brand and industry – selling „Asian hospitality‟– allows it to train and then transfer its 
core competencies over to the Middle East nearly intact. It probably helped that, among these 
core competencies, were a focus on people management and handling cultural differences, 
subjects covered extensively during staff training; a set of skills at its core naturally adaptive 
in nature, and well-suited to the challenges of internationalization. The business model 
behind their resorts was also positioned to cushion the pressures of new frontiers; limited 
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„strategic partnerships‟ with the actual owners of the land, via management contracts, engage 
the efforts of their local partners to smooth the transition.  
 
However, the destabilizing influences of global recession of 2007-2008, and the Dubai debt 
crisis that ensued, proved enough to halt Company D's expansion dead in its tracks. Company 
D‟s seeming imperviousness to socio-political forces was reliant to a great extent on the 
strength of its brand; with a sudden dearth of its premium guests, and a new lack of funding 
among (and therefore, from) local partners, the said brand quickly found itself on the wane in 
the region, with Company D suddenly finding the going a lot closer to the rocky mountain 
side of some of its resorts than that of the pristine desert dunes of others. Even before the 
political unrest in some areas resulting from events in Egypt, Company D was unfortunately 
in the process of retreat from several areas in the region; a process not without acrimony and 
legal tussles. 
 
OUR FINDINGS 
 
Our previous research into Singapore‟s regionalization programs provides telling evidence 
towards the critical importance of the socio-political dimension towards the location and 
eventual performance of international investments. Our research on the internationalization of 
Singapore companies into the GCC further reveals a somewhat disturbing, but not altogether 
unexpected, reliance on local (GCC) partners and equally Singaporean third-party 
organizations such as IE Singapore (and less so, Singapore Business Federation)  to shield 
firms – government-linked or otherwise – from the reportedly rocky socio-political forces of 
the region. Unsurprising as it is, evoking as it does echoes of the „partnerships‟ with host 
governments that were the chosen vehicle for Singapore‟s regionalization initiatives, it is a 
strategy with obvious limitations – some immediately apparent, such as the possibility of 
conflicting goals causing friction between partners and threatening to derail the project itself, 
and some initially less so, until some years further in, when Singaporean companies find 
themselves with limited relevance due to „local partners‟ learning from their processes and 
expertise. The former, in the wake of the global financial crisis, have already emerged, with the 
primarily business concerns of local partners finding areas of disconnect with their Singapore 
counterparts amongst financial aftershocks; and further exacerbated in some areas of the region 
as a result of political instability in the wake of events in Egypt and Tunisia. At the current 
time, it is unknown, and somewhat doubtful, whether many of the Singapore companies in the 
GCC countries will be able to step up to the plate for the challenge of „doing business in the 
Middle East‟ without a guiding hand, given the abovementioned narrow focus and overly 
cautious entry shown by some of the case-study companies. Most Singapore companies, it 
seems, have yet to embrace fully a true entrepreneurial mindset in their internationalization 
efforts. 
 
Conversant to the above, the transfer of core competencies by these companies to their 
operations in the GCC countries appear to have been, by and large, been performed under the 
aegis of the same local partnerships, with rather mixed results. In Company A‟s case, for 
strategic, budgetary or other miscellaneous considerations, not enough competencies may have 
been imported into their operations; certainly not enough to have conclusive, or even 
inferential, proof as to how effective said competencies may or may not have been. In other 
cases (e.g. Company C ), the transfer of „core competencies‟ has arguably been more hindrance 
than help, with an organizational structure of ostensible benefit to the company‟s global 
operations creating time delays and opportunities for miscommunication, and allowing an 
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endemically Singaporean thought process to carry too much weight in the conducting of 
business in a distinctly different environment. Thus far, the best performance has been turned in 
by companies whose very product and very brand have a utility that is unique in nature, and not 
easily replaced, as with Company D; which is unsurprising, given that such unique products 
generally have some degree of resistance to socio-political factors; however, the rarefied nature 
of this product arguably may have led to a lack of resilience against financial shocks, the 
repercussions of which continue to plague Company D.  
 
We also find, intuitively, that companies with a more international focus had progressively 
fewer issues with the socio-political environments of the GCC countries – presumably due to 
the more international focus, as opposed to a preoccupation with domestic issues, creating a 
greater flexibility in operations. This often translates to an equivalent willingness to adapt. We 
surmise that such an international focus is also generally less conducive to the identification of 
particular business concepts and qualities as „core competencies‟ – which, by and large, we find 
to not have been helpful, and possibly even hindering, operations in the GCC economies. Thus, 
the theorized necessity for „new viewpoints‟ – for companies to leave behind preconceptions 
and realize the greater need for companies to enact change in response to new business 
environments, to build new wings to their business with expertise, but not expectation. Perhaps 
even on a literal level; it is interesting, to say the least, that Company B, a relatively new entity 
among Singapore GLCs, should seem to find less trouble in taking a pro-active, international, 
and adaptive approach to business in the GCC countries. Developing a good eye for business in 
the Middle East, perhaps, may be as simple as a pair of new glasses. 
 
These observations dovetail neatly with those expressed in our interviews with representatives 
from both IE Singapore and the Singapore Business Federation, particularly with regards to 
over-reliance on 'core competencies' and weakness in relationship management (Yeoh & How, 
forthcoming); issues which, we note from our past research, appear endemic to Singapore 
companies in other regions, but which have all the more negative impact in environments as 
unique as those of the GCC economies.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With these preliminary findings in mind, Singapore companies looking to expand into the 
Middle East would be well-advised to consider carefully how far to attempt to do things „as 
they have always done so before‟. Results from further years in the region – especially, in the 
case of those in the property sector, post-completion of their current projects (which may, in 
certain cases, be a while in the coming) – will no doubt be most enlightening as to the benefits 
and pitfalls of reliance on what companies like to call their „core competencies‟.   
 
In the wake of the Dubai debacle, the GCC region now perhaps carries the weight of a deserved 
dose of caution among both local partners and foreign entrants towards grandiose projects; and 
is also a region where the influence of socio-political forces on business cannot have been more 
strongly underlined than by the aftereffects of events in Egypt and Tunisia. Nevertheless, 
however, it remains a fact that the region is a fast-developing area with ample potential as a 
development frontier, and certainly still looks to remain such for the foreseeable future; and as 
such, our research, going forward, will continue to place the magnifying glass on the regions 
touched upon in this paper (Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai), as well as other investment 
regions, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and, possibly, the other emirates of the UAE. With 
this, we hope to continue to both provide a reasonably up-to-date panorama into the role of 
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Singapore in the Middle East, and build a basis for further research into the both this 
fascinating region, and the cryptic and enigmatic methodology which the city-state continues 
to employ in its internationalization efforts. 
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